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Abstract. Convolutional neural networks or standard CNNs (StdCNNs)
are translation-equivariant models that achieve translation invariance
when trained on data augmented with sufficient translations. Recent work
on equivariant models for a given group of transformations (e.g., rotations)
has lead to group-equivariant convolutional neural networks (GCNNs).
GCNNs trained on data augmented with sufficient rotations achieve
rotation invariance. Recent work by authors [9] studies a trade-off between
invariance and robustness to adversarial attacks. In another related work
[10], given any model and any input-dependent attack that satisfies a
certain spectral property, the authors propose a universalization technique
called SVD-Universal to produce a universal adversarial perturbation by
looking at very few test examples. In this paper, we study the effectiveness
of SVD-Universal on GCNNs as they gain rotation invariance through
higher degree of training augmentation. We empirically observe that as
GCNNs gain rotation invariance through training augmented with larger
rotations, the fooling rate of SVD-Universal gets better. To understand
this phenomenon, we introduce universal invariant directions and study
their relation to the universal adversarial direction produced by SVD-
Universal.
1 Introduction
Universal adversarial perturbations are input-agnostic so that the same pertur-
bation fools the trained model on a large fraction of test inputs. Recent work
by [17,18] on universal adversarial perturbations looks at the curvature of the
decision boundary. Their universal attacks are more sophisticated than the simple
and fast, gradient-based adversarial perturbations, and require significantly more
computation. Dezfooli et al. [18] give a theoretical justification for existence
of universal adversarial perturbations using directions in which the decision
boundary has positive curvature. Khrulkov and Oseledets [11] propose a different
method to construct a universal adversarial perturbation. Their perturbation
is based on computing the (p, q)-singular vectors of the Jacobian matrices of
hidden layers of the network. The authors then judiciously select a particular
layer to construct an attack and for that layer they choose the best possible
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(p, q)-singular attack vector. In [10], the authors propose a simpler technique to
obtain universal adversarial perturbations from input-dependent perturbations
such as Gradient, FGSM or DeepFool. The authors show that the following
universalization technique yields universal adversarial perturbations whose fool-
ing rates are comparable to [17] but weaker than that obtained in [11]. Take
a small random sample of size 64 of the test data and for each point in the
sample, construct an input dependent adversarial attack vector. Output the top
singular vector of these adversarial attack vectors as the universal adversarial
perturbation. Unlike in [11] where the authors need access to the various layers
of the neural network, and where the authors compute an approximation to the
(∞, 10)-singular vector, the computational overheads in [10] are significantly less.
Furthermore, the authors in [10] support their technique with theoretical bounds.
Geometric transformations such as rotations, translations are simple input
transformations that are model-agnostic and input-agnostic and work as natural
attacks during test time, see [5], [7]. One way to counter such attacks is to use neu-
ral network models that are translation and rotation-equivariant by construction.
Standard Convolutional Neural Networks (StdCNNs) are translation-equivariant
but not equivariant with respect to other spatial symmetries such as rotations,
reflections etc. Variants of CNNs to achieve rotation-equivariance and other
symmetries have received much attention recently, notably, Harmonic Networks
(H-Nets) [19], cyclic slicing and pooling [4], Tranformation-Invariant Pooling (TI-
Pooling) [14], Group-equivariant Convolutional Neural Networks (GCNNs) [2],
Steerable CNNs [3], Deep Rotation Equivariant Networks (DREN) [15], Rotation
Equivariant Vector Field Networks (RotEqNet) [16], Polar Transformer Networks
(PTN) [6]. However, we use GCNNs as the representative rotation equivariant
networks since they have both, good invariance properties, and a theoretical
justification based on representation theory [13].
A natural question is to study the fooling rates of the universal adversarial
perturbations from [18], [11] and [10] on equivariant networks such as the above.
In this paper, we extend the empirical analysis of [10] to rotation equivariant
networks with augmentation. Since these networks achieve invariance to rotations
with augmentation, a natural question is whether there are perturbations to
which a well trained model is agnostic, so even a large perturbation along those
directions does not fool the network? We show that this is indeed the case
and call such directions, universal invariant perturbations. One would expect
these directions to be orthogonal to the universal adversarial perturbations. We
empirically show that this is the case.
To address these questions we use StdCNNs which are translation equivariant
networks. For the rotation-equivariant networks we use GCNNs as a representative
network. However, both StdCNNs and GCNNs require rotation augmentation
at training time to be invariant to rotations. GCNNs based on steerable filters,
have a solid theoretical justification as shown by Kondor and Trivedi [13], and
achieve nearly state of the art results on MNIST-rot and CIFAR-10 as reported
by Esteves et al. [6]. In the main paper we only report experiments on the dataset
CIFAR-10. Experiments on MNIST are reported in the Appendix B.
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1.1 Connection between fooling rate and error rate
In some of our experiments we compute the fooling rate of perturbations, and in
some others we compute the error rate of perturbations. We show in Appendix A
that the difference between the two is marginal for networks trained to achieve
high accuracy. The proof is borrowed from [10][Appendix A].
2 SVD-Universal for models trained with larger rotation
augmentations
There has been a lot of work on making CNN’s robust to geometric transforma-
tions like rotations and translations of input images so that the label assigned by
a classifier to an image and its rotated/translated version is the same. GCNNs [2],
Harmonic nets [19] and Clebsch Gordon networks [12] are some neural networks
designed to be equivariant to such geometric transformations. To make these
networks equivariant to such transformation it is necessary to augment the train
data. So in addition to upright images, rotations of images are also added to
the training phase. In this section we evaluate the error rate of SVD-Universal
attacks on StdCNNs and GCNNs trained with data augmented with rotations.
To set the stage, in Section 2.1, we first give the error rate of these attacks on
GCNNs when the training data and test data are not augmented with rotations.
2.1 Error rates for GCNN’s on CIFAR-10
For a fair comparison with the results in [10], the GCNN configuration used
for CIFAR-10 is the same as that of ResNet18, except that the operations going
from one layer to the next are replaced by equivalent GCNN operations, as given
in [2]. Similarly the GCNN used for MNIST, has the same configuration as the
StdCNN configuration given in Table 2 with equivalent GCNN operations as
given in [2].
Fig. 1: On CIFAR-10, GCNN/ResNet18, Singular values of attack directions over
a sample of (left) 500 and (right) 10,000 test points.
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Recall that the theoretical justification for the existence of universal adversarial
perturbations in [10], is the drop in singular values of the matrix of attack
directions for a small sample of test inputs of CIFAR-10. We show that the
same phenomenon holds for GCNNs also. We first trained the GCNN to achieve
high accuracy on CIFAR-10. We take a sample of test inputs of CIFAR-10 and
using the trained GCNN, obtain input dependent adversarial attack vectors
(Gradient, FGSM and DeepFool attacks). We plot the singular values of the
matrix of attack vectors in Figure 1, and observe that the graph is similar to
that in [10][Figure 3] - the drop in singular values is a shared phenomenon across
all the input dependent attacks, exactly as reported in [10] for StdCNNs. We
then used the top singular vector of these input dependent adversarial attack
vectors as a universal perturbation, SVD-Universal. We plot the error rates for
SVD-Universal obtained with various sample sizes in Figure 2. When the `2 norm
of the universal perturbation constructed from DeepFool (Figure 2., bottom)
using a sample of size 100 is scaled to 8, the error rate is more than 25%. Since
the error rate of the trained GCNN on CIFAR-10 is about 5%, it follows from the
results in Appendix A, that this universal adversarial perturbation fools more
than 20% of the test inputs.
Fig. 2: On CIFAR-10, GCNN: error rate vs. norm of perturbation along top
singular vector of attack directions on 100/500/10000 samples, (top left) Gradient
(top right) FGSM (bottom) DeepFool
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2.2 SVD-Universal for models trained with larger rotation
augmentations
We also evaluate the error rate of SVD-Universal attacks on equivariant networks
when the training data is augmented with rotations. We report this on the
CIFAR-10 data set in Figures 3 and 4. The equivariant network architecture is
discussed in section 4.
We augment the networks with random rotations of training data in the range
±180◦. Figure 3, left, shows that SVD-Universal attack vectors improve their
error rate when ResNets are trained to handle larger rotations - the error rate of
SVD-Universal perturbation of norm 10 constructed from unaugmented test data
(0◦), is about about 50% on the (unaugmented) test data when the network is
trained to handle rotations of 180◦ (black line in the figure), as against an error
rate of 40% when it is not trained to handle rotations. There is no significant
difference between the figures on the left and on the right in Figure 4. While 0/0
and 180/0 difference is about 10% in StdCNNs, 0/0 and 180/0 is very different
for rotation-equivariant GCNNs. For GCNNs we observe a similar trend, the
universal attack shows a larger error rate on networks trained to handle larger
rotations (compare the black line in Figure 4, left, with the blue line in the same
figure). The Figures on the right were obtained by training the network with
data augmented with rotations upto ±180◦. The test data is also augmented
with random rotations upto ±180◦. And our universal perturbation is obtained
from sampling this augmented data. Both, in StdCNNs, as well as in GCNNs,
the error rate remains almost the same, even as test is augmented with rotations
that the model was trained with.
The construction of adversarial attacks that work for a given image as well
as its geometric transformations (especially, rotations) has been of interest in
literature, e.g., see [1].
Convention used in the legends of our figures. We use the following convention
in the legends of some plots. A coloured line labeled A/B indicates that the
training data is augmented with random rotations from [−A◦, A◦] and the test
data is augmented with random rotations from [−B◦, B◦]. If A (resp. B) is
zero it means the training data (resp. test data) is unrotated. If the model is
trained with random rotations from [−A◦, A◦] and the test data is randomly
rotated with varying B to draw the plot, we only mention A and not B, which is
self-explanatory.
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Fig. 3: On CIFAR-10, error rate of our universal attack using top singular vector
of 100 test point gradients, for StdCNN/ResNet18 train-augmented with random
rotations in range [−θ◦, θ◦] (left) test unrotated, (right) test-augmented with the
same range of rotations as the training set.
Fig. 4: On CIFAR-10, error rate of our universal attack using top singular vector
of 100 test point gradients, for GCNN/ResNet18 train-augmented with random
rotations in range [−θ◦, θ◦] (left) test unrotated, (right) test-augmented with the
same range of rotations as the training set.
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3 Universal invariant perturbations
Let x be an image for which the predicted label of a neural network classifier
f is f(x). For highly accurate classifiers trained on data that already contains
small rotation augmentations, one would expect f(x + ∆(x)) = f(x), where
x + ∆(x) is the image resulting from a small rotation applied to x. For an
image x, we call I(x) an invariant perturbation for x, if f(x + I(x)) = f(x).
Using this terminology we expect ∆(x) to be an invariant perturbation for x for
classifiers trained on data that is inherently (or additionally) augmented with
small rotations. A natural question is whether there are any universal invariant
perturbations x + u that are invariant for most x. We show empirically that
there are such universal invariant perturbations. By their very definition we
would also expect that universal invariant perturbations will not be universal
adversarial perturbations. We show this empirically by plotting the error rates of
the top singular invariant perturbation of CIFAR-10 on StdCNN/ResNet18 and
GCNN/ResNet18 in Figure 6. The error rate is below 0.2 even when the norm of
the invariant perturbation is scaled up to 50.
For illustration purposes we augment Figure 1 in [10] with g′1, g
′
2, g
′
3 which
are orthogonal to g1, g2, g3 respectively, the minimal `2-norm perturbations such
that f(xi + g
′
i) = f(xi). These g
′
i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} are examples of input dependent
invariant perturbations. Similar to v, a universal adversarial perturbation, we
show there is a v′ which is universal invariant perturbation, orthogonal to v.
Fig. 5: Illustration of the universal adversarial attack problem.
We give more empirical evidence of such invariant perturbations - we show
that the principal angles between the subspace of the top 5 universal adversarial
perturbations and the subspace of the top 5 universal invariant perturbations
are all close to 90◦. Since universal invariant directions are easy to compute,
this opens up the possibility of computing adversarial attacks from invariant
directions. We also view these invariant directions as images (refer section 3.2)
- they seem to show some interesting structure. This could be of independent
interest in the study of rotation-equivariance and steerable filters.
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Fig. 6: Error rate vs norm of perturbation using top singular invariant vector for
StdCNN and GCNN on CIFAR-10 test data.
3.1 Principal components of attack and invariant directions
To construct the matrix, we pick a batch of 100 images, and for each image x
in our sample we compute the difference between x and its 2 degree rotation.
We stack these (input dependent invariant directions) as rows of the matrix and
compute the top singular (unit) vector w. We call w the universal invariant
perturbation. Figure 6 shows the error rate of w as a function of  on CIFAR-10
for StdCNNs and GCNNs. The curves are flat indicating that these directions
are invariant perturbations.
Table 1 shows deeper analysis using principal angles between subspaces.
The two 5-dimensional SVD subspaces of adversarial directions and invariant
directions, respectively, have nearly 90◦ principal angles.
Recall that for two subspaces V ,W , the first principal angle is defined as the
minimum angle between two unit vectors v1 ∈ V , w1 ∈W . The second principal
angle is the minimum angle between unit vectors v2 ∈ V,w2 ∈W , with v2 ⊥ v1
and w2 ⊥ w1. The other principal angles are defined similarly.
Table 1: Principal angles between Top-5 SVD-subspace of gradient directions of
test points, and the Top-5 SVD-subspace of invariant directions on test points
(small 2◦ rotations) respectively.
Dataset Model 1 2 3 4 5
CIFAR-10 StdCNN/ResNet18 89.99 89.83 89.53 88.92 88.65
CIFAR-10 GCNN/ResNet18 89.91 89.82 89.60 89.32 88.97
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3.2 Visualizing universal invariant perturbations
We visualize the top 5 singular vectors in Figure 7 obtained by the method
given in Section 3.1 for MNIST data which was intially augmented with random
rotations in range [−180◦, 180◦]. These invariant directions seem to be similar in
structure to steerable filters. We believe this underlying structure is useful and
of independent interest.
Fig. 7: On MNIST, Top 5 SVD vectors from image difference
4 Data sets and model architectures used
Data sets MNIST dataset consists of 70, 000 images of 28 × 28 size, divided
into 10 classes. 55, 000 used for training, 5, 000 for validation and 10, 000 for
testing. CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60, 000 images of 32× 32 size, divided into
10 classes. 40, 000 used for training, 10, 000 for validation and 10, 000 for testing.
All experiments performed on neural network-based models were done using
the test set of CIFAR-10 datasets.
Model Architectures For the CIFAR-10 based experiments we use the ResNet18
architecture as in [8]. For the MNIST based experiments we use the StdCNN
architecture given in Table 2. This is same as that in [2].
We also evaluated SVD-Universal on rotational equivariant networks. We
report our findings with GCNN’s[2] as our base architecture for equivariant
networks. For a fair comparison the GCNN configuration used for CIFAR-10
is the same as that of ResNet18, except that the operations going from one
layer to the next are replaced by equivalent GCNN operations, as given in [2].
Similarly the GCNN used for MNIST, has the same configuration as the StdCNN
configuration given in Table 2 with equivalent GCNN operations as given in [2].
Input training data was augmented with random cropping and random horizontal
flips.
5 Conclusion
We show how to use a small sample of input-dependent adversarial attack
directions on test inputs to find a single universal adversarial perturbation that
fools state of the art neural network models also works better as networks are
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Table 2: Architectures used for the MNIST experiments
Standard CNN GCNN
Conv(10,3,3) + Relu P4ConvZ2(10,3,3) + Relu
Conv(10,3,3) + Relu P4ConvP4(10,3,3) + Relu
Max Pooling(2,2) Group Spatial Max Pooling(2,2)
Conv(20,3,3) + Relu P4ConvP4(20,3,3) + Relu
Conv(20,3,3) + Relu P4ConvP4(20,3,3) + Relu
Max Pooling(2,2) Group Spatial Max Pooling(2,2)
FC(50) + Relu FC(50) + Relu
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5)
FC(10) + Softmax FC(10) + Softmax
made more invariant to a specific transformation. We introduce the study of
universal invariant directions, whose visualizations are reminiscent of steerable
filters. We believe that a study of how the subspaces of universal adversarial
perturbations and universal invariant perturbations change as a model gains
invariance can shed more light on invariance vs. robustness trade-off.
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A Fooling rate and error rate.
Let D be a distribution on pairs of images and labels, with images coming from a
set X ⊆ Rd. In the case of CIFAR-10 images, we can think of X to be the set of
32× 32 CIFAR-10 images with pixel values from [0, 1]. So each image is a vector
in a space of dimension 1024. Let (X,Y ) be a sample from D and let f : X → [k],
be a k-class classifier. The natural accuracy δ of the classifier f is defined to be
Pr(X,Y )∈D[f(X) = Y ].
The error rate of a classifier is Pr(X,Y )∈D[f(X) 6= Y ]. An adversary A is a
function X → Rd. When A is a distribution over functions we get a randomized
adversary. The norm of the perturbation applied to X is the norm of A(X) (we
only consider `2 norm in this paper).
In Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [17,18] and Khrulkov and Oseledets [11], the authors
consider the fooling rate of an adversary. A classifier f is said to be fooled on
input x by the perturbation A(x) if f(x+A(x)) 6= f(x). The fooling rate of the
adversary A is defined to be
Pr(X,Y )[f(X +A(X)) 6= f(X)].
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The error rate of A on the classifier f is defined to be Pr(X,Y )∈D[f(X +A(X)) 6=
Y ]. It is easy to see that
Pr(X,Y )∈D[f(X +A(X)) 6= Y ]
= Pr(X,Y )[f(X +A(X)) 6= Y |f(X) = Y ] Pr(X,Y )[f(X) = Y ]
+ Pr(X,Y )[f(X +A(X)) 6= Y |f(X) 6= Y ] Pr(X,Y )[f(X) 6= Y ]
≤ Pr(X,Y )[f(X +A(X)) 6= Y |f(X) = Y ] + (1− δ).
So, if the natural accuracy of the classifier f is high, the fooling rate is close to
the error rate.
B SVD-Universal on MNIST
Similar to section 2.2 we evaluate the error rate of SVD-Universal attacks
on equivariant networks when the training data is augmented with rotations.
We report this on the MNIST data set in Figures 8 and 9 for StdCNN and
corresponding GCNN, respectively. We notice similar trend in Figure 8 as in
Figure 3 that the universal attack becomes better as the network achieves better
invariance to larger rotations with augmentation.
Fig. 8: On MNIST, error rate of our universal attack using top singular vector of
100 test point gradients, for StdCNN train-augmented with random rotations in
range [−θ◦, θ◦] (left) test unrotated, (right) test-augmented with the same range
of rotations as the training set.
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Fig. 9: On MNIST, error rate of our universal attack using top singular vector of
100 test point gradients, for GCNN train-augmented with random rotations in
range [−θ◦, θ◦] (left) test unrotated, (right) test-augmented with the same range
of rotations as the training set.
